Are Individuals Fickle-Minded?
Mathew D. McCubbins and Mark Turner
Abstract
Game theory has been used to model large-scale social events—such constitutional
law, democratic stability, standard setting, gender roles, social movements,
communication, markets, the selection of officials by means of elections, coalition
formation, resource allocation, distribution of goods, and war—as the aggregate
result of individual choices in interdependent decision-making. Game theory in this
way assumes methodological individualism. The widespread observation that game
theory predictions do not in general match observation has led to many attempts to
repair game theory by creating behavioral game theory, which adds corrective terms
to the game theoretic predictions in the hope of making predictions that better match
observations. But for game theory to be useful in making predictions, we must be
able to generalize from an individual’s behavior in one situation to that individual’s
behavior in very closely similar situations. In other words, behavioral game theory
needs individuals to be reasonably consistent in action if the theory is to have
predictive power. We argue on the basis of experimental evidence that the
assumption of such consistency is unwarranted. More realistic models of individual
agents must be developed that acknowledge the variance in behavior for a given
individual.

1 Introduction
Methodological individualism focuses on individual agents. It views large-scale
social phenomena as the result of individual mental states that lead to actions.
Specifically, in this book, methodological individualism is defined as the view that
all explanations within the social sciences should be centered around individuals,
their actions, beliefs, preferences, and the like. Accordingly, social phenomena such
as the French revolution, an increase in the crime rate, residential segregation, the
government’s decision to lower the taxes, and the occurrence of unions are to be
explained in terms of individuals, their actions, and the like.
Game theory analyzes outcomes as the aggregate result of choices that
players make during interdependent decision-making. These choices are viewed as
grounded in individual cognition by the players about the players involved, the
actions they take, the information they possess, the strategies available to them, the
outcomes they anticipate, and the equilibria that can be achieved across them.
Game theory makes a core set of assumptions about individual agents,
namely, that they have consistent beliefs and preferences; that their actions result
consistently from those preferences and beliefs; that these preferences, beliefs, and
actions remain consistent across equal choice moments; and that the basic mental
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processes and inference procedures by which preferences and beliefs lead to actions
remain the same under all conditions.
It is widely established experimentally that subjects do not in general follow
the predictions of game theory. Accordingly, behavioral game theorists have
stepped in with new assumptions about consistent deviations from classical
rationality and assigned to subjects consistent dispositions to account for these
deviations — dispositions having to do with risk preference, cognitive abilities, social
norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims
about how individual human minds work when choosing.
In this article, we assess the game-theoretic modeling of individual agents.
We argue that these game-theoretic models assume a consistency in these agents that
is, as yet, unwarranted. We argue that more realistic models of agents must be
developed on the basis of systematic empirical research.
2 Generalizing from experimental data
The conception in game theory that consistent preferences drive decisions has had
extraordinary influence lately. Literature in the social sciences is replete with
publications reporting choices by subjects engaged in economic games in laboratory
settings. Typically, these articles draw macroscopic inferences for real behavior from
the behavior of these individuals in the laboratory. For example, here is the thesis of
a highly-cited 1995 paper on general human behavior in transactions:
We designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an
investment setting. … Observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a
basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust
extended to an anonymous counterpart. … Is trust a primitive in economic
models of behavior? What factors increase (or decrease) the likelihood of trust
in economic transactions? We provide answers to these questions in a specific
experimental setting, the investment game. By guaranteeing complete
anonymity and by having subjects play investment game only once, we
eliminate mechanisms which could sustain investment without trust; these
mechanisms include reputations from repeat interactions, contractual
precommitments, and potential punishment threats. We then show that
positive investments still occur, suggesting that trust is an economic
primitive. (Berg et al. 1995, pages 122-123.)
The reasoning in this article—leading to the conclusion that trust is an
economic primitive for individual agents—follows a common path: some subjects
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play a single game in a laboratory setting; their behavior is interpreted as the reliable
outward sign of how they think and decide; accordingly their behavior in this one
game in an experimental setting is used as a principle for modeling them as
individual agents tout court; and this model of individual thinking and individual
deciding is then generalized to human cognition and behavior in the world.
The ambition to use economic games run in laboratory settings as a
microcosm of the world is understandable. Science prefers when possible to reduce
vast complexity to simpler principles, to smaller pictures congenial to human
thought. It would indeed be most useful if this reduction of social phenomena to a
summation of actions by individual subjects in economic games proved to be
scientifically legitimate.
But we should be cautious: the history of human ideas is replete with
reductions that have turned out to be wrong, often to the surprise of generations of
people who relied on them. In many cases, these misguided reductions are still
powerfully with us. Vedic astrology continues to exert strong influence on decisionmaking among Hindus. The Tarot deck provides a remarkable microcosm for
understanding the future and for planning accordingly, but it has not been shown to
have any scientific value. Haruspication of entrails, augury, cartomancy, palmistry,
pyromancy, and I Ching divination are similar reductions. These reduction
strategies are often parodied—once they are discarded by a culture—for their
vacuity.
In this paper, we present experimental evidence indicating that the drawing
of macroscopic inferences about human behavior from the behavior of individuals in
individual economic games in laboratory settings is not yet warranted.

3 What is Going on in the Laboratory?
Laboratories in the social sciences are unlike laboratories in the physical sciences.
Laboratories in the physical sciences are constructed under the view that the physical
conditions in the laboratory can be designed so as to match exactly the relevant
conditions of interest in the world. There is in this conception nothing, so to speak,
about the bench scientist’s laboratory bench per se that stops the scientist from
generalizing from what happens on the bench to the rest of reality, inclusive of those
real situations that take place far from the scientist’s bench. This happy conception
of seamless generalizability allows the physical sciences, with the right care and
nuance and adjustments, to claim that causal relationships detected in the laboratory
for the most part generalize automatically to the world.
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The case is utterly different for experiments on human beings, who belong to
a social species evolved for behavior under certain conditions, and those conditions
are not laboratory conditions. In principle, the burden is on the experimenter to
show that the conditions in the laboratory do indeed match the relevant conditions of
interest in the world in all the right ways. This can be a heavy burden, for several
reasons.
We must assume as a beginning point that laboratory experiments involving
economic games should fail to generalize to the world. The first reason we must
make this defensive, defeasible assumption is that there are powerful and wellknown “experimenter effects.” For a physical or chemical system, or most biological
systems, such as algae, no one imagines that the system is thinking, consciously or
unconsciously, about the experimental situation and the experimenters. But human
subjects are thinking, consciously and unconsciously, about both the experimental
condition and the experimenters. Accordingly, absent compelling proof to the
contrary, although one can assume that the data from such an experiment, if the
experiment is impeccable on all other methodological scores, reveals something
about how the subject behaves in that experimental condition, one cannot in
principle assume that it reveals anything about how the individuals behave outside
of that experimental condition.
The second reason for doubting that data from experiments involving
economic games will generalize is that human beings and human cognition are
evolved for messy environments. Conditions of the laboratory are sparse—which
means that they are not the conditions for which human beings are evolved. The fact
that the conditions of the laboratory are sparse requires us to be skeptical that
generalization from experimental data to ecological human behavior is legitimate.
Vision, for example, is evolved for conditions of white light, which are quite messy.
Tests in the laboratory on human vision using simple, clean, monochromatic light do
indeed show something important—namely how the human vision system operates
under those experimental conditions—but it does not generalize to normal human
vision. Color constancy, for example, an indispensable feature of human vision and
inference, does not work under monochromatic light the way it does under normal
conditions. An experiment under conditions that have not been demonstrated to
match those in the real-world situations of interest is called “ecologically invalid,” or
just “invalid.”
In sum, methodological rigor requires that we begin from the default
assumption (albeit a defeasible default assumption) that laboratory experiments
involving economic games do not generalize to human behavior. We are warranted
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in giving up that assumption only where high covariance has been reliably
demonstrated between the behavior in the economic game and in the normal human
setting. It cannot in general be assumed that inferences established from the
microcosm of the economic games in laboratory settings generalize to the human
macrocosm.
4 Classical Economics and “Playing Nash”
Research using economic games in experimental settings begins with the baseline
assumption—taken from classical economics, as in (Morgenstern & von Neumann
1947)—that subjects will optimize their payoffs within the strip of interdependent
decision-making called the “game,” and do so by assuming that other agents will
optimize their own payoffs. On these assumptions, interaction in interdependent
decision-making must follow an equilibrium path. In this article, we will say,
without summarizing the well-known details, that a game-player is “playing Nash”
when she is following a rule for play (a “solution concept”) that will give her the
optimal payoff that she can achieve through her own unilateral choices in a game
where she is assuming both that all the other players are playing Nash and that all
the players know each other’s equilibrium strategies. More generally, we will say
that the classical paradigm proposes to explain human behavior through closed-form
analytic models as a function of the Players involved, the Actions they can take, the
Information they possess, the Strategies available, the Payoffs for actions, the
Outcomes for the players, and the Equilibria that can be achieved across players—
PAISPOE, for short.
Experiments with subjects playing economic games show that in general they
do not play Nash. This is the oldest news on the planet, and we have nothing to add
to that consensus, except that our batteries of experiments show the same thing.
Details are available in (McCubbins & Turner 2012; McCubbins, Turner, & Weller
2012a, 2012b, & 2012c).
5 Epicycles
Interpreters of data often guess why the players do not play Nash. To have scientific
weight, these guesses would need to survive being tested as new hypotheses against
out-of-sample data. Treating these guesses as knowledge would be “adding
epicycles”—a slang term for “bad science.” The term refers to the supposed
penchant of Ptolemaic astronomers to preserve the underlying theory by adding
cycles-upon-cycles-upon-cycles as needed to erase the divergence between the theory
and the known data.

5

The need to avoid epicycles in scientific investigation is well understood.
Gigerenzer (2004: 602) offers what he calls “Feynman’s conjecture”:
To report a significant result and reject the null in favor of an alternative
hypothesis is meaningless unless the alternative hypothesis has been stated
before the data was obtained.
6 “Bounded Rationality” as an epicycle
The first and still the best-known patch for PAISPOE models is “Bounded
Rationality,” a term coined by Herbert Simon. According to Simon, rationality of the
PAISPOE variety is limited because people lack information or have cognitive limits,
including limits imposed by inability to think fast enough in the time available.
Without a doubt, as every cognitive scientist knows, cognitive limits often make it
impossible for people to do full PAISPOE calculation. Also without a doubt, lack of
information can impede PAISPOE reasoning. Work by scholars such as Herbert
Simon on “satisficing” and Gerd Gigerenzer on “heuristics” has contributed to our
understanding of alternatives to PAISPOE reasoning.
Asserting that bounded rationality accounts for the mismatch between data
and PAISPOE models is not in principle scientifically illegitimate. Quite the
contrary. But the assertion is merely an epicycle if it is presented as an explanation
for the mismatch, in the absence of a demonstration that a particular limit is indeed
the cause of the mismatch.
When economists guess that subjects are failing to play Nash because
bounded rationality impedes their ability to understand the structure of the game
and its payoffs, the economists sometimes train the subjects on the game through
“trial” rounds before they begin gathering the data that will be the basis of their
conclusions. Training utterly stops any possibility of generalizing the behavior in the
game to ecological behavior, for two reasons: (1) training creates an absolute
difference between crucial conditions in the experiment and the ecological situations
in which human beings have not been trained; (2) it is well-known in cognitive
science that human beings can be trained to a frame that is contrary to their own
patterns, and trained to it so well that it no longer seems alien; the benefits of such
training are widely known in the martial arts, navigation, mathematics and scientific
reasoning, diplomacy, and so on; and there is no reason to assume that behavior
under training to a frame will generalize to normal human behavior—indeed, the
mismatch was the very reason for training the human being.
Although it is indisputable that human rationality is bounded, adding
“bounded rationality” to PAISPOE models as an epicycle has not provided us with
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any better models of human behavior than were provided by classical economics of
the Morgenstern & von Neumann variety.
7 Framing
Since framing can influence decision, it is often proposed that deviation from Nash is
accounted for by framing. The classic example of such a framing analysis is
Kahneman and Tversky’s “Prospect Theory,” which proposes that differences in the
framing of a choice can bias the choice one way or another despite the fact that the
framing is immaterial to the consequences of the action with respect to the payoff
matrix (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 & 2000). If we frame an action as a trade, then,
since every trade is both a loss and a gain, it is possible for us to frame the action so
as to emphasize loss or gain. Prospect theory proposes that there is a bias depending
on this framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; and Tversky and Fox, 2000): it is
assumed within expected utility theory that choosers are in general risk-averse, but,
on the contrary, ceteris paribus, there is, according to prospect theory, a four-fold
pattern of risk attitudes: risk-seeking for gains of low probability and for losses of
high probability; risk-aversion for gains of high probability and for losses of low
probability (Tversky & Fox, 2000, p. 94). Accordingly, choosers will tend to make
different choices depending on how the choice is framed—as loss or gain—despite
the fact that the expected values of the alternative choices are identical. Kahneman &
Tversky focus on framing effects in the decision-theoretic problem of choosing
between alternative lotteries. Economists have since expanded this line of research
into game-theoretic contexts, showing for example that framing affects the choice to
contribute to a public good or impose externalities on others (see for example
Andreoni, 1995; Cookson 2000). McDermott, Fowler, & Smirnov (2008) argue that
“context-dependent” attitudes toward risk have a basis in evolutionary psychology.
Post, Van den Assem, Baltussen, & Thaler (2008) show this same sensitivity to
framing in the high-stakes choices of contestants on the game show “Deal or No
Deal,” a decision environment decidedly far-removed from the foraging of our
evolutionary ancestors.

1

8 Character type
1

Unlike experimental studies of framing, Post et al. rely on observational data, in

which the frame (previous earnings) is not controlled by an experimenter but
generated endogenously by the subject.
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It is often proposed that subjects have a certain character or psychological type that
accounts for their deviation from Nash. For example, it is purported that people
vary in the extent to which they are “self-regarding” versus “other-regarding.”
Purportedly, people vary in their “risk preference.” Purportedly, people vary in
their tendency to forego personal gain when doing so delivers a comparably much
larger gain for other players. Purportedly, people vary in their preference for “fair”
outcomes. And so on. It is also proposed that different players have different “levelk” signatures in particular settings. The idea behind “level-k” signatures is simple,
and often used in films and novels. Consider, for example, this passage from The
Princess Bride:
The Sicilian smiled and stared at the wine goblets. "Now a
great fool," he began, "would place the poison in his own goblet,
because he would know that only another great fool would reach first
for what he was given. I am clearly not a great fool, so I will clearly
not reach for your wine."
"That's your final choice?"
"No. Because you knew I was not a great fool, so you would
know that I would never fall for such a trick. You would count on it.
So I will clearly not reach for mine either."
"Keep going," said the man in black.
"I intend to." The Sicilian reflected a moment. (Goldman 1973,
139-140.)
The Sicilian, to make his decision, is thinking that the man in black is thinking
that the Sicilian is thinking that the man in black is thinking that the Sicilian is
thinking that . . . . In theories of Level-k reasoning, we begin with Level Zero. It is
not clear to us from the literature what Level Zero is thought to be, but it is described
as “unstrategic thinking,” so perhaps a Level-0 thinker (say Ann) simply shoots
straight for the maximum payoff for herself in the payoff matrix, without any
thought that the other player (say Paul) might have preferences of his own and so,
strategically, interfere by making choices that move the Level-0 player, Ann, toward
a different outcome, one that is better for Paul. “Unstrategic thinking” might mean
that Ann chooses as if she is playing against random, non-intentional events—
perhaps a role of the dice. She is then playing “against nature,” in the economic
parlance, where, oddly, “nature” does not include intentional human cognition. Paul
is a Level-1 thinker if he is playing so as to interact optimally with a Level-0 player.
And so on up the line: a Level-2 thinker is imagining what a Level-1 thinker is
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thinking and responds optimally to a Level-1 thinker’s strategy. And a Level-3
thinker responds optimally against a Level-2 thinker, and so on.
The Sicilian, a self-assessed genius (“Never go in against a Sicilian when
death is on the line!”) is many k-levels beyond everyday human subjects. He is even
careful to prepare against potential adaptive behavior by the man in black (e.g, the
man in black, an unequaled fighter, might try to kill the Sicilian, who is holding a
large knife to Buttercup’s throat to prevent this adaptive behavior): the Sicilian
distracts the man in black, managing to get him to look away from the goblets for a
second, during which brief interval of time the Sicilian switches the goblets. After
they have drunk and swallowed, the man in black announces that the Sicilian has
guessed incorrectly. The Sicilian crows, “You only think I guessed wrong . . . That’s
what’s so funny. I switched glasses when your back was turned.” Of course, the
Sicilian dies in the next second from the iocane powder poison: the man in black, like
human beings everywhere, has behaved adaptively rather than strategically in the
game. As he explains to Buttercup, “They were both poisoned. I’ve spent the past
two years building up immunity to iocane powder.”
Guesses can be hypotheses, but not explanations. Adding terms or factors to
a theory that has failed tests, for the sake of making the theory fit the data, is
methodologically acceptable if these changes are regarded as new, untested
hypotheses.
9 A Battery of Experiments to Test Epicycles
To test whether behavior in economic games can be generalized to the world at all,
we look for the most likely candidate, that is, behavior to which the generalization is
most likely to apply. We take it that behavior in one economic game is most likely to
apply to behavior
1.

by the same subject

2.

under identical experimental conditions

3.

in closely similar economic games

4.

very near in time
Accordingly, we must put the identical subject through a continuous battery

of such games under the identical experimental conditions. Furthermore, in running
this battery, we should
1.

avoid training subjects, as discussed above, yet

2.

test that they understand the payoff matrices and strategies of other players

by quizzing them;
3.

make framing as spare and general as practical; and
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4.

hold framing as consistent as possible across this battery of measures so as

to avoid variation in behavior owing to variation in framing.
This is what we have done. Our battery included many economic games.
10 Can we generalize from behavior in economic games?
Subjects in our experiments are told that they are randomly paired at the beginning
of every task with someone else in another room and that all their behavior is
anonymous and private and that all the subjects have the same information. They
receive no feedback on their play or indeed any information except in the few
interactive games that they play at the end of the battery (e.g. Trust), where they
must be told what the other player sent. They know that they are paid for every task
according to how they perform, and that they will be paid at the end of the
experiment in private by an assistant who will know only their number and the
envelope of cash to be given to the person with that number. The following analysis
considers data from 190 subjects for four economic games in our battery: Trust,
Dictator, Donation, and Majority Public Goods. Of course, we do not use these
misleading names in describing the experiment to subjects. These names are only for
ease of reference.
Let us begin with the Trust game. Player 1 and Player 2 both begin with $5.
Player 1 can send any integer dollar amount to Player 2, including $0. Whatever
Player 1 transfers is tripled and given to Player 2. Then Player 2 can return any
integer dollar amount to Player 1, and the game ends. Notice that if Player 1 sends
anything but $0, then Player 2‘s pot of money becomes at least twice as large as
Player 1‘s, maybe much larger. For example, if Player 1 sends $1 to Player 2, then
Player 1 is left at that point with $4, but the $1 sent is multiplied by 3, so Player 2 has
$8. “Nash” for Player 1 is to send $0. Do our 190 subjects play Nash as Player 1 in
Trust? Hardly. 105 of 190, or 55.3%, send money as Player 1. This is just an example
of the well-established fact that human subjects, informed that they are playing in an
economic game with other human subjects, cannot be relied upon to play Nash. It is
this fact, as we discussed above, that induces the proposal of epicycles.
105 subjects out of 190 received money as Player 2 in the Trust Game. Can we
count on them to play Nash and return $0? No. Given that they had every reason to
view themselves as having been placed in an advantageous situation, can we count
on them to be generous and not play Nash? No. 64 of these 105 subjects, or 61%,
play Nice and return money, and 41 of these 105 subjects, or 39%, play Nash.
At this point, we can all feel the great temptation to “explain” these events by
reducing the causality in the decision-making to personality: 61% of these Subjects
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are “Nice” (or “other-regarding”) and 39% are not nice (or “self-regarding,” or
whatever)—we call them “Nash.”
Our central point is that such a conclusion depends upon assuming that
human beings are consistent in their preferences and methods of making choices and
that if they make a different choice it is because they face different conditions, yet it
is just this assumption that most needs to be tested empirically.
Our battery of experiments was designed so as to let us test the hypothesis
that “personality type” generalizes, in other words, that people are consistent. Does
a subject’s supposed “Nice” versus “Nash” type generalize to even the identical
subject’s behavior in identical settings and identical conditions during the same span
of a few hours in a similar economic game? Our battery was designed so that
subjects played both Player 2 in the Trust and Player 1 in Dictator under the identical
payoff conditions and, going forward, the identical game structure. In the Dictator game,
there are two players: the Dictator (Player 1) and the Receiver (Player 2). The
Dictator has an endowment and chooses what part of it, if any, to send to the
Receiver. The Receiver receives the amount sent and the Dictator keeps that part of
the endowment the Dictator chose not to send, and that is the end of the game. The
Receiver’s role is entirely passive. We arranged our Dictator game so that the
Dictator has the same endowment he or she has in the role of Player 2 in Trust, and
that the Receiver has the same endowment he or she has in the role of Player 1 in
Trust. These endowments are common knowledge. Accordingly, our Dictator game
is identical to the second half of our Trust game. In effect, each individual subject
plays the second half of the Trust game twice. Formally, there was no mathematical
or economic difference in any individual subject’s conditions as Player 2 in Trust and
Player 1 in Dictator.
Specifically, for any specific subject S*, S* was in the role of Player 2 in Trust
at one point in the battery and Player 1 in Dictator at another point in the battery.
We introduce the label t(S*) for the other subject with whom S* was randomly paired
in Trust. We introduce the label d(S*) for the other subject with whom S* was
randomly paired in Dictator. In Trust, where both t(S*) and S* begin with $5, t(S*)
sends an amount (perhaps $0), which is tripled and added to the $5 endowment
which S* had at the beginning of the game. At that point in the Trust game, S* has a
dollars and t(S*) has b dollars. Later in the battery of experiments, S* plays Player 1
in Dictator, and we arranged the experiment so that in Dictator, the endowment for
that particular subject S* is exactly a and the endowment for specific subject d(S*) is
exactly b. That is, the endowments that a given subject S* faces in the two games are
identical at these two points in the two games. Here is a table:
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Money that players have after the P1 send in Trust:
S* has a | t(S*) has b
Money that players have as endowments in Dictator:
S* has a | d(S*) has b
At this point in each of the two games, S* (for the 105 subjects who received
money as Player 2 in Trust) has at least twice as much money as the other person.
Accordingly, in Dictator, for these 105 subjects, a is always at least twice as large as b,
and sometimes much bigger.
In both games, at this point, there is only one choice left to make, and that
choice is identical in both games: S* must choose how much, if any, of a to send to the
subject with whom S* is randomly paired in that game. So at this point in the two
games, going forward, the two games have the identical structure and payoffs.
Do the purported Nice v. Nash personality types we might think we see
when subjects play Trust Player 2 generalize even to the identical economic situation
with the identical choice to make, now in Dictator?
No. 41 of the 64 Nice types as Trust Player 2 are Nice in Dictator, but 23 are
Nash. So the generalization works for only 64% of the Nice subjects. 37 of the 41
subjects who are Nash during Trust Player 2 are Nash as Dictator Player 1; the
generalization on “Nash” personality type holds (at this point) for 90% of subjects,
making the “Nash” generalization look (at first blush) better than the “Nice”
generalization, but still not a reliable generalization, since 10% of the Nash-types in
Trust Player 2 are Nice as Player 1 in Dictator.
Next, we compare the behavior of each of these subjects in Trust to the
behavior by the same subject as Player 1 in the Donation game. In Donation, both
players begin with $5. Player 1 can pass any amount of the $5 to Player 2. The
amount is multiplied by 4 before it is given to Player 2. Then the game ends. In this
case, any amount of Niceness by Player 1 results in a fourfold level of Niceness
received by Player 2, as measured in money. For example, if Player 1 passes $1,
Player 1 is left with $4, but Player 2 now has $9. If Player 1 passes $5, Player 1 is left
with $0, but Player 2 now has $25. Do the Nice versus Nash personality types we
think we might see in Trust Player 2 and Dictator generalize subject by subject to the
Donation Game?
No. Of the 41 most completely confirmed Nice types in Trust and Dictator,
27% suddenly are Nash in Donation. That is, 41 of the 190 subjects receive money as
Player 2 in Trust, send money as Player 2 in Trust, and send money as Player 1 in
Dictator. But 27% of those 41 are Nash in Donation! Now consider the 23 Ss who
receive money as Player 2 in Trust, play Nice as Trust Player 2, but play Nash as
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Dictator Player 1. What do they do in Donation? Half (12) of those 23 play Nice and
half (11) play Nash. Consider the 37 subjects of 105 with the clearest Nash character
type: they receive money as Trust Player 2 yet return nothing, and also send nothing
as Dictator Player 1. Can we at least count on this confirmed 35% of the pool of 105
subjects who received money as Trust Player 2 to be rock solid Nash? No. In
Donation, 30% of them play Nice. And so on.
Next, we compare what these specific subjects did when they played the
Majority Public Goods game. In this game, each subject is assigned randomly to a
group of 10 subjects (about whom they know nothing and with whom they cannot
communicate) and given $5. The subjects can each keep the $5 or move the $5 to a
group pot. If at least 6 of the 10 do so, then the pot is tripled and each subject in the
group receives a 10% share of the pot. If fewer than 6 of the 10 do so, then nothing
from the pot is given back to the subjects. This game is not a perfect distinguisher
between Nice and Nash, because there is one place where they overlap. A subject
who plays Nash will not contribute if the subject thinks that 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of
the other players in the group will contribute. But if the subject believes that exactly
5 of the others will contribute to the pot, then the subject believes that joining the
group of givers would raise its membership to exactly 6, in which case the subject
receives $9 by contributing but $5 by not contributing. Can we rely on the purported
Nice types to play Nice in the Majority Public Goods game?
No. For example, of the 30 subjects out of 190 who receive money as Player 2
in Trust, return money as Player 2 in Trust, send money as Player 1 in Dictator, and
send money as Player 1 in Donation, 13, or 43%, do not contribute in the Majority
Public Goods Game. Similarly, of the 26 subjects who receive money as Player 2 in
Trust, return 0 as Player 2 in Trust, send 0 as Player 1 in Dictator, and send 0 as
Player 1 in Donation, 5, or 19%, contribute in the Majority Public Goods Game.
Similarly, for other sub-sub-sub-subcategories of the subjects, we find that a putative
“personality” signature is unreliable in predicting behavior in the Majority Public
Goods Game.
In summary, of the 105 subjects who received money as Player 2 in Trust,
only 17, or 16%, keep a consistently “Trusting” or “Cooperative” or “Generous”
signature, and only 21, or 20%, keep a consistently “Ungenerous” signature.
But what about those 105 subjects who send money as Player 1 in Trust?
Surely they were Nice. In the Trust game, both players do much better if they trust
each other: if Player 1 sends the full $5 available, then Player 2 has $20 and can send
$10 back to Player 1. Both players then have doubled their initial endowment.
Husbands and wives in community property states, or any two people under a
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trusted contract according to which they split the benefit, should, under Nash,
immediately send everything as Player 1 in Trust, because the contract means that
you do not have to rely on the generosity of the other person: you own a 50% share
of all assets, and so does the other player.
Let us compare behavior in the Trust Game with behavior in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (PD). Prisoner’s Dilemma was another part of our battery. It is
always set up so that a strategy of cooperating is strictly dominated by a strategy of
defecting: Whichever choice the other player makes, the subject is always better off in
choosing to defect. A Nash player, of course, must defect. Yet, if both players
cooperate, they are better off than if both players defect.
The data are complicated at this point by the fact that we tested four different
kinds of framing of the identical choice and payoff structure. The subjects did not all
receive the same framing. Methodologically, we might prefer then not to lump them
together, but this raises an interesting point: we often see in the literature data
lumped together from different experiments with different protocols, run at different
times by different experimenters, moreover using a between-subjects design. In our
case, we have a within-subjects design, in the sense that the same subjects played
both Trust and Prisoner’s Dilemma. Under all four Prisoner’s Dilemma framings, the
payoffs were identical and everything else was held constant, except for the four
framings. In all four versions, each subject had the choice to cooperate or to defect.
Lumping these four groups together is not methodologically clean, but it is fairly
conservative relative to the practices we often find in the literature, and our
overarching point here is that one should doubt generalizations assumed in the
literature. Can generalizations hold up over this lumping? Here are the results.
We start with the 105 Ss who play Nice as Player 1 in Trust. Did they play
Nice in Prisoner’s Dilemma? No. 34 of 105, or 32%, play Nice. But 68% play Nash.
Now let us look at the other 85 subjects. 85 subjects play Nash in sending $0
as Player 1 in Trust. Do they play Nash in Prisoner’s Dilemma? Not so much. 65 of
85, or about 76%, play Nash. But 20, or about 24% play Nice.
11 Characterizations Do Not Hold Up
Perhaps there are other ways to use economic games as laboratories in which
behavior can be generalized to the world. Perhaps there are other signatures, other
reductions, in the form of characterizations. Perhaps there are other ways in which
economic games can serve as a microcosm from which we can learn about the
macrocosm of human behavior. But the ways we review here—all of which are
forms of characterizing actors as having stable preferences and stable ways of
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making choices—do not withstand our tests of their validity, and conclusions from
them should be held in abeyance until science develops more realistic models of
individual agents on the basis of systematic empirical research.
12 Conclusion
Common sense tells us that people have beliefs and desires, or beliefs and
preferences; that they are aware of them; and that they act according to them. But
cognitive science has undermined commonsense notions of the mind. What we take
for granted about human thought has proved to be unimaginably more complex
than anyone had expected; to be profoundly misrepresented by our supposedly
bedrock, commonsense, intuitive notions; and to be conducted almost entirely in the
backstage of cognition, invisible to consciousness. The cartoons of consciousness are
highly useful, and there is no evolutionary advantage in building consciousness so
that it can see through them. Human beings are awesomely effective, but for the
most part clueless about how they work.
The basic assumptions about the human mind made in PAISPOE models may
seem unassailable, sheer common sense, but that cuts no scientific ice. There status
as common sense is no reason to accept them. Rather, they are hypotheses, and, as
such, must be tested to have weight.
More than thirty years ago, Lee Ross (Ross 1977) coined the term
“fundamental attribution error” for the excessive tendency of everyday “intuitive
psychologists”—that is, everybody—to explain other people’s behavior by
attributing dispositions to them. Jocularly but also aggressively, and certainly
influentially, he proposed that this error was the main basis for the field of social
psychology.
There are many assertions made in economics that depend upon the folkpsychology assumptions we see in PAISPOE models, such as that what players are
doing under a set of beliefs must be in equilibrium. Where the data diverge from the
PAISPOE models, it is tempting to deploy the fundamental attribution error to
explain that divergence between model and data, by adding an epicycle that consists
of characterizing the actors by attributing stable dispositions. But perhaps the
PAISPOE assumptions, and the assertions that depend upon them, are wrong in the
first place. In cognitive science, commonsense notions of how vision works, how
language works, how memory works, how categorization works, how inference
works, and so on have all fallen by the wayside.
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We propose that the future of economics lies not in drawing further
conclusions from PAISPOE assumptions but rather in testing them scientifically in
order to recast the foundations of the field.
If we accept the game-theoretic assumption that people have consistent
preferences and consistent methods of deciding and that different choices are the
result of different conditions, what are we to make of the data from our battery of
experiments? One hypothesis would be that we somehow fielded a group of fickleminded people, alien individuals, who gave us data that we must throw out as
bizarre, or that the experiments are corrupt, or that the design involved confounds,
and so on—and all of these possibilities should be considered.
But there is another logical possibility that we must also consider: perhaps the
assumption that individual agents have consistent preferences and consistent
methods of decision-making that run across different situations and contexts is
wrong. After all, it is not clear on evolutionary or cognitive grounds that individual
agents should be expected to work in this way. There is room for doubt. These
assumptions of game theory may be reductions that we must discard. Before we
launch centuries of research on the assumption that the solar system is geocentric, we
should collaborate to take that assumption and test it to destruction. Before we
launch centuries of research on the assumption that individual agents are to be
modeled as consistent modulo circumstances, we should collaborate to take that
assumption and test it to destruction. Our point is not at all that, with a little data,
we prove that these assumptions are clearly wrong, but rather that we can now see
that they are assumptions. We cannot base science on untested assumptions. If we
are to build a house, we must build it on rock rather than sand, and if these
principles are what we mean to build our house upon, we must first prove that they
are rock and not sand. We have not done that.
This paper questions one prominent example of a theory committed to the
thesis of methodological individuals, that is, game theory. We have argued that
science needs a more adequate model of the individual actors than the one espoused
by game theory. We need more realistic conceptions of agents—conceptions which
must be developed on the basis of systematic empirical research. We do not suggest
that a more adequate model of agents would automatically serve as support for the
strong view of methodological individualism. No matter where the debates between
methodological individualists and holists may land, there will be ample room in any
workable social science for accounts that refer to actors.
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